Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) account for well over half of all Chinese exports and this share continues to grow. While the substantial presence of FIEs has contributed greatly to the recent export-led growth of China, an important objective of the Chinese government is to ultimately obtain foreign technologies and develop their own technological capabilities domestically. This paper uses detailed data on Chinese exports by sector and type of enterprise to examine the extent to which domestic enterprises are "keeping up" or even "catching up" to FIEs in the volume, composition and quality of their exports. We also use a newly-created dataset on Chinese policies encouraging or restricting FIEs across sectors to examine the extent to which such policies can affect the evolving composition of Chinese exports.
Introduction
The phenomenal growth in Chinese trade with the rest of the world since the opening of its markets in the 1980s is well documented. Recent attention has begun to examine the sources of such growth, particularly the concomitant growth of foreign firm presence in China and their use of China as a low-cost export platform. Whalley and Xin (2006) document that the foreign-invested enterprise (FIEs) share of Chinese exports has risen from around 10% in 1990 to almost 60% in 2004 (Figure 4, p. 5) . The Chinese experience in this regard is unique in that a substantial portion of FIE presence is by investors from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan -regions which are considered politically separate to some degree, but are populated with ethnic Chinese who have strong connections to mainland China.
However, the share of FIE from other countries is significant and growing over time.
More broadly, the Chinese situation is also unique in its mixture of markets and statecontrolled portions of the economy. Openness to market forces has been allowed in a stepwise fashion by the government since 1980, with successive new policy announcements, presumably informed by prior experience. With respect to foreign direct investment (FDI), market openness really began with the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces in 1979 that allowed FIEs for the first time, charging such enterprises a profit tax lower than that applied to domestic enterprises. Through the 1980s, the number of these special zones increased substantially, and by 1991 many of the restrictions limiting FIEs to SEZs were lifted. Nevertheless, there continues to be substantial government oversight with respect to FDI in that all new FIE projects require approval from the central government and regional governments. In addition, FIEs are often subject to performance requirements regarding export percentages, local content and technology transfer. In 1997, the Chinese government published the "Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries", which provided explicit information on which sectors it encourages, restricts, or prohibits FDI. Tax policies toward FIEs has changed over time as well, with initially lower tax rates for FIEs to recent elimination of such special treatment in accordance with China's accession to the World Trade Organization which specifies "national treatment" of tax policies. 1
There are a couple features of the Chinese government's policy objectives towards FIEs that will be important for our analysis and which have been deemed important by previous literature as well. The first is the Chinese government's concern with the negative competition effects of FIEs on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and its intention to limit domestic access to FIEs. The first SEZs were purposely chosen to be in regions that had little industrial (and, hence, SOE presence) . Branstetter and Feenstra (2002) estimate using provincial data on FIE presence from 1984 through 1995 find that the Chinese government's FIE policies are inherently weighting the welfare of the SOEs four to seven times larger than consumer welfare. In addition, wholly-owned FIEs are almost always subject to minimum export targets and local content requirements in order to limit their domestic sales, but keep their domestic purchases high. Nevertheless, the share of SOEs in the Chinese economy and its exports have been falling significantly as the share of FIEs and, more recently private firms, has increased.
A second Chinese policy objective with respect to FDI is facilitation of technology transfer from FIEs to domestic enterprises. Technology transfer agreements are often an implicit quid pro quo necessary for approval of an FIE project, and are explicitly necessary to 1 More detailed discussion of these policies and policy changes are discussed by Li and Li (1999) , Rosen (1999) , and Graham (2004) .
get approval of an FIE project that will also have access to the domestic market. (Rosen, 1999, p. 72) The clear intent is to improve the Chinese's own productive capabilities allowing them to fully appropriate the profits from their manufactures of technological goods and increasing their long-run growth potential. The risk is that such policies are discouraging FDI in these sectors and, thus, causing China to miss out on the type of technological spillovers that would occur naturally.
The evidence on the net effect of such technology transfer policies is far from known with only a bit of evidence to date. For example, the Chinese government has required foreign automakers to partner with domestic producers, and Shanghai Automotive recently announced plans to start up its own factory to produce a luxury sedan based on plans purchased from Rover after jointly producing autos in China with General Motors and Volkswagen for many years. Whether Shanghai Automotive will be successful in this independent venture is clearly uncertain. Chen and Swenson (2006) and Hale and Long (2006) provide the first careful evidence on productivity spillovers from foreign firms to domestic ones in China. Both find evidence for such spillovers, but for very limited groups of Chinese enterprises. Chen and Swenson (2006) finds evidence for positive own-industry productivity spillovers for private domestic firms in China (which are still a fairly small portion of the Chinese economy), while Hale and Long (2006) finds that such spillovers are only positive for the most technologically advanced Chinese enterprises.
The extent to which Chinese firms are able to develop their own productive capabilities and transition from state-controlled firms to private, market-oriented firms is extremely important. Whalley and Xin (2006) undertake a growth accounting exercise that finds that while the employment share of FIEs is only 3%, they account for over 20% of the Chinese economy and around 40% of its recent growth. Their conclusion is that the sustainability of China's export growth and, indeed its overall GDP growth, is suspect if inward FDI flows plateau. This would be especially true if productivity spillovers are limited.
This point also relates to recent analysis by Rodrik (2006) , which shows that the composition of Chinese exports is much closer to that of a developed economy than other developing economies and, that this "advanced" composition of China's export basket is correlated with higher long-run growth potential. 2 However, the extent to which FIEs are behind such compositional differences, as well as spillover potential, clearly affects this assertion. Wang This chapter examines these issues by first presenting a model of potential foreign investment into a vertically-differentiated industry, with a foreign firm producing a higher quality product than its Chinese rival. The two-period model begins with a foreign firm deciding whether to locate production into China, knowing that foreign investment into China will lower its production costs, but may lead to greater technology transfer due to closer proximity to the Chinese firm. The model generates a number of predictions for relative market shares and prices (unit values) charged by the two firms. We also generate predictions about how Chinese government policies toward FDI will affect these patterns as well. We then examine these hypotheses using detailed data on Chinese exports by type of enterprise (wholly-owned foreign invested enterprises, state-owned enterprises (SOEs, joint ventures, etc.) to analyze the evolution of Chinese export market shares and unit values over time during our sample period of 1997-2005.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review while section 3 presents a model of foreign investment into China. We briefly discuss the descriptive analysis of exports and unit values over time in section 4.
Section 5 offers the empirical analyses and section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
A significant portion of the previous academic literature on export activities of China and the role of FIEs has concerned itself with ownership issues. and Feenstra, Hanson, and Lin (2004) FIEs. In addition, exports receive different Customs treatment depending on whether imported inputs are supplied by the foreign party or not. Feenstra and Hanson (2005) develop a property-rights model to explain when the foreign party will own the plant and/or make input decisions, and when such ownership and input decisions will be made by the Chinese party. Their model and empirical analysis finds that foreign owners will be more likely to cede control over input decisions when the value added in processing those inputs is higher (such as for more-technologically-advanced products) and when contracts are easier to write. A complementary study by Feenstra and Spencer (2005) develops a model to understand the economic forces that determine whether foreign firms outsource intermediate inputs through pure external transactions, through contractual arrangements, or through their own foreign affiliates. They use data on Chinese export behavior by these various types of arrangements to verify their model's predictions that the variety of exported intermediate inputs from foreign affiliates and contractual arrangements increases more relative to "ordinary" exports the lower the (internal) transport costs within China.
There is a very recent empirical literature that has begun to examine export behavior and productivity spillovers using a 2001World Bank survey of 1500 firms across 5 major Chinese cities. Hale and Long (2006) estimate productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms in the same industry and city using these data and find evidence for such effects only for the most technologically advanced Chinese firms. Further investigation finds that a significant part of this effect is due to these firms' higher share of managers with foreign-firm experience, suggesting that spillovers are occurring through labor mobility. 3 Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2006) use the Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment to examine whether exporting affects productivity of the foreign firms in the sample. 4 Variation in export destinations and their currency devaluation with the crisis is used to identify the effect of exporting experience on firms' productivity. The study estimates that such "learning-by-exporting" effects are significant for firms exporting to developed countries, but not those exporting via Hong Kong or directly to less-developed countries. A final paper that uses these World Bank survey data, and which is perhaps closest in topic to this chapter, is Brambilla (2006) . This study presents a model that connects experience and productivity to firms' ability to develop new product varieties. She finds that foreign firms in the sample introduce about twice as many new varieties as domestic ones and, consistent with the model's predictions, a significant portion of this is due to productivity differences.
The papers we have surveyed to this point are mainly microeconomic and relatively static in their analysis, using detailed firm-or product-level data to document patterns of firm organization and performance for a given period of time. A number of papers have taken a broader view of Chinese exporting patterns. For our purposes, we focus on Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2006) . Rodrik (2006) compares the composition of China's exports and finds that it is much closer to that of OECD countries than its level of per-capita income would suggest. This bodes well for China in that a related paper by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2006) find a strong correlation between the sophistication of a country's export basket and its economic growth. Schott (2006) verifies this increasing sophistication of the export bundle in terms of the types of products exported by China, but finds that its "exports sell at a substantial discount relative to its level of GDP and the exports emanating from the OECD."
(p. 17). Neither paper examines the role of FIEs in these export patterns. Yet Whalley and Xin's (2006) analysis suggests that FIEs account for the majority of exports from China and find that overall growth of the Chinese economy is quite dependent on the highly-productive FIEs in their economy.
A Model of Foreign Investment into China
In this section we present a simple model to motivate what one may expect to happen to FDI decisions by foreign firms into China, technology transfer from foreign firms to Chinese ones, and the ultimate impact on the share of Chinese exports by foreign firms.
Producers
We employ a partial equilibrium set-up, with one foreign firm and one domestic Chinese firm producing a good. For convenience, we assume away demand in the Chinese market so that both firms only supply consumers in the foreign country. Thus, prior to any FDI decision by the foreign firm, the Chinese firm is the sole source of Chinese exports of the good to the foreign country.
There is vertical differentiation of the good supplied by the two firms, with the foreign firm producing a higher quality good with quality level K F , and the Chinese firm producing with a lower quality level K CH ; i.e., K F > K CH . 5 Variable production costs are lower for any firm located in the Chinese market, with an assumed zero constant marginal cost of production in China, and a marginal cost of c>0 in the foreign market. Thus, FDI into the Chinese market is attractive to the foreign firm due to the lower costs of production.
However, we also assume that technology transfer may occur between the firms if the foreign firm locates in the Chinese market. This technology transfers raises the quality (K CH ) of the low-quality Chinese producer, but comes at a cost. For convenience, we assume that technology transfer is zero if the foreign firm does not locate production in the Chinese market. 6 Because of this difference the foreign firm has incentives to not locate production in the Chinese market, everything else equal.
Consumers
Consumers have identical preferences for goods, but vary in their income levels. We assume that income levels are distributed uniformly over the unit interval where h indexes the consumer with income of h. Consumers may purchase the good from either the foreign or domestic producer or choose not to purchase. If they do not purchase the good, they receive a level of utility equal to U 0 h, where U 0 >0. If they purchase the good from a supplier, they receive utility of U(K i )(h-p i ), where p is the price charged by the supplier and i=CH,F. We make the natural assumption that U(.) is increasing in K so that higher quality means higher utility. We also restrict U(K)>U 0 for all K so that all consumers would prefer to purchase a product (regardless of its quality) if its price is zero.
With this set-up we can now solve for the demand function for each firm in the following way. Given the parameter space we consider (particularly our restrictions on marginal cost above), the high-quality firm will always charge a higher price than the lowquality firm in equilibrium (p F > p CH ). Thus, demand along the unit interval of consumers can be divided into the sections shown in Figure 1 , with the highest-income consumers choosing the high-quality variety and lower-income consumers choosing the low quality variety or possibly not purchasing the good. This gives us two cut-off income levels: h F designates the consumer indifferent to purchasing either the high-or low-quality variety, while h CH designates the consumer indifferent between purchasing the low-quality variety or not purchasing the good. Formally, the following expression of indifference obtains for the consumer at h F :
Letting x denote U(K F ) and y denote U(K CH ), we can easily derive the following expression for h F :
In similar, fashion h CH can be solved as:
General expressions of demand for each firm are then easily derived as:
and
Timing of Decisions
We assume that the foreign firm is initially producing a high-quality variety in the foreign country with per-unit costs of c, while the Chinese firm is producing a low-quality variety in the domestic Chinese market with per-unit costs of 0. In period 1, the foreign firm first decides whether to invest into the China or not. If they locate into China, their per-unit production costs are immediately reduced to 0. Then both firms choose their prices simultaneously to compete for consumers.
If the foreign firm locates into China in the first period, then in period 2 the Chinese firm decides how much to invest in transferring technology from the foreign firm. In particular, we assume that the Chinese chooses a λ Є [0,1] that leaves it with a new quality level K Tech = (1-λ)K CH +λK F . The Chinese firm may choose to not engage in technology transfer activities (λ=0), which would leave it with its original level of quality, K CH . The associated level of consumer utility connected with this new level of quality is U(K Tech ).
Costs of technology transfer are increasing in λ, via a quadratic function, C Tech (λ) = θλ 2 .
Once a level of technology transfer is chosen, indexed by λ, then the firms compete in prices again. If the foreign firm did not locate in the foreign market, the firms compete in prices again under the same conditions as in the first period with no foreign firm relocation. Profits for each firm in each period take the general form of ) , , , , ,
where t denotes the period-subgame combination.
Solving for equilibrium
We solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the model in the usual fashion by solving backwards beginning with period 2 of our model. In period 2, there are two possible subgames -one where the foreign firm did not locate in China and, thus, technology transfer did not occur (which we denote as 2N) and one where the foreign firm located in China and technology transfer has potentially occurred to the Chinese firm (which we denote as subgame 2T). In subgame 2N, the foreign firm does not locate production into China and continues to have a cost disadvantage (i.e., c>0), but no technology transfer occurs (λ=0). In this case, we denote the respective Nash Equilibrium profits of the foreign and Chinese firms as ) , 0 , , ,
are the optimally chosen prices by the Chinese and foreign firm, respectively.
These equilibrium prices and profits will be identical to those in period 1 when the foreign firm does not relocate to China (denoted subgame 1N).
The more interesting and relevant case for our purposes is subgame 2T, where the foreign firm has located into China and reduced its production costs from c to 0, but the Chinese firm has the ability to increase its quality from K 1 to K Tech through technology transfer. Given costs, qualities and optimally chosen technology transfer, the firms simultaneously choose their own price to maximize profits. We denote the respective Nash Equilibrium profits of the foreign and Chinese firms in this subgame as ) , , ,
and are the optimally chosen prices by the Chinese and foreign firm, respectively, and λ is the optimal degree of technology transfer chosen by the Chinese firm.
From this, we get Propositions 1a and 1b:
Proposition 1a: The ratio of the foreign firm's equilibrium price to the Chinese firm's equilibrium price is decreasing in the amount of technology transfer. (See appendix for proof) Proposition 1b: The ratio of the foreign firm's market share to the Chinese firm's market share in equilibrium is decreasing in the amount of technology transfer. (See appendix for proof)
The results in propositions 1a and 1b are quite intuitive. It is easy to show in the model that a higher quality firm will charge a higher price. Thus, as technology transfer leads to the quality of the two firms converging, the equilibrium prices charged by the firms also
converge. An increase in technology also allows the low-quality firm to "steal" market share away from the high-quality firm even though the high-quality firm will optimally respond by lowering its equilibrium price some.
Now we turn to the Chinese firm's optimal technology transfer decision as represented by their choice of λ prior to the market competition in period 2. The Chinese firm's problem is to choose λ to maximize second-stage profits net of technology transfer costs:
From this optimization problem, we can easily derive:
Proposition 2: The level of technology transfer chosen by the Chinese firm is decreasing in the cost/difficulty of such transfer (θ). (See appendix for proof)
This leads to the following corollaries: 
Corollary 3a: The greater the cost of technology transfer, the less the Chinese firm's equilibrium price moves closer to the foreign firm's equilibrium price for the case where the foreign firm locates in China. (See appendix for proof)
and are the optimally chosen prices by the Chinese and foreign firm in this subgame. It's easy to show the following relationships between equilibrium profits for the foreign firm:
This leads us to an analysis of the foreign firm's initial decision whether to engage in FDI or not by locating in China. Assuming a one-time fixed cost of FDI, which we denote as F, the foreign firm decides to locate to China if
This leads to
Proposition 4: The FDI decision by the foreign firm into China is more likely, 1) the greater the cost savings, and 2) the greater the cost/difficulty of technology transfer . (See appendix for proof)
While our empirical work below does not examine data on FDI into China, Proposition 4 highlights that FDI is endogenous with the ability of Chinese firms to transfer technology from the foreign firm. When technology transfer is made relatively easy by the FDI, the foreign firm is less likely to locate in China. This selection issue suggests that we may only observe FDI into industries where technology transfer is difficult/costly. Thus, we may find little evidence of convergence of relative export prices and increases in Chinese market share after as FDI increases in an industry. Our empirical analysis below will account for this potential endogeneity bias.
Role of government policies
The Chinese government has active policies to encourage or restrict FDI into certain industries or products. A simple way to examine the impact of these policies in the model is to simply think of these policies as either lowering or raising the fixed costs of FDI (F).
Encouragement of FDI (lowering of F) would obviously lead to the condition in (15) being more likely satisfied, increasing the probability of FDI. The immediate effect would be to increase the foreign firm market share (from zero when no FDI takes place). However, the foreign firms that did not engage in FDI in the first place were ones for which technology transfer would be more significant or production cost decreases from location to China less significant. If the encouragement policy selects a foreign firm into China that otherwise would have stayed out because of technology transfer concerns, then by Proposition 1a and 1b, we may expect the encourage policy to lead to a greater decrease in the ratio of foreignto-Chinese market shares and unit values over time.
Of course, all of these effects stemming from a policy of encouraging FDI would be the exact opposite with a Chinese government policy of restricting FDI, if such restrictions simply increase the costs of FDI. However, in many cases, Chinese restrictions on FDI involve requiring foreign firms to partner with a Chinese firm and/or arrange for technology transfer. A prominent example of this is the automobile industry. This restriction can easily be modeled as a lowering of technology transfer costs (θ) in our model, which by corollaries 3a and 3b would make the ratio of foreign-to-Chinese market shares and unit values decrease in the second period, ceteris paribus. However, both the higher fixed costs of FDI and greater technology transfer makes it less likely that the foreign firm would enter.
Ownership structure
For simplicity, we do not consider alternative forms of FDI ownership structure in our model. However, the data we explore below have considerable amounts activity from both joint venture and wholly-owned foreign enterprises. Joint venture activity presumably facilitates greater technology transfer (i.e., lower costs of transfer for the Chinese firm). A foreign firm could conceivably be interested in pursuing a joint venture, nevertheless, if it lowered its fixed costs of FDI or provided an even greater reduction in production costs.
This would lead to a positive selection effect, making it more likely that a foreign firm will invest in China despite technology transfer concerns. Thus, while we have not modeled a foreign firm's decision of ownership structure, this discussion suggests that when a foreign firm does choose to joint venture, we should expect a greater decrease in relative foreign-to-Chinese market shares and unit values over time than in the case where the foreign firm chooses to be an independent, wholly-owned foreign enterprise.
A Brief Descriptive Analysis of Exports and Unit Values over Time
Before examining our hypotheses, we briefly describe and look at some general trends in the primary data set on Chinese exports we use for our analysis. These Chinese For purposes of our analysis below, we will primarily separate our data into two groups which we call the foreign firms, consisting of the CJVs, EJVs, and FIEs, and the Chinese firms consisting of the COEs, POEs, and SOEs.
Empirical Analysis
We now turn to a statistical analysis of relative market shares and unit values for foreign and Chinese exports from 1997 through 2005. Our focus is the changes over time in these relative foreign-to-Chinese measures and how various factors, as suggested by our model, affect these dynamic patterns. Our estimation strategy is quite simple with benchmark models specified as the following: 
where FS jt is the foreign enterprises' share of Chinese exports for a given 6-digit HS (HS6) product code and year, UV jt F and UV jt CH are Chinese export unit values for the foreign and
Chinese enterprises for the HS6 product code j and year t, respectively, YD t are year dummy variables, ψ j are the HS6 product fixed effects, and ε jt is an assumed white-noise random error term. Given that we exclude our sample's first year, 1997, our year dummy coefficients capture the difference in the dependent variable from 1997, allowing one to easily chart the progression of these relative measures over time. Given the specification of the dependent variable in (16), the coefficients on our year dummies in our "market share regressions"
show the percentage point different in the foreign market share from our base year, 1997.
For the "unit value regressions" in (17), the year dummy coefficients capture the percentage difference from the base year, 1997.
From these benchmark models, we explore a number of factors that may affect the evolution of relative market shares and unit values over time, as motivated by the theoretical model in section 3. We do this by introducing interaction of these factors, in turn, with our
year dummies. Throughout our tables of empirical estimates, we make the distinction between the individual coefficient estimates on the interaction terms between a factor and the year dummies (denoted as "Marginal Differences") and the sum of the interaction terms and their associated year dummy coefficients (denoted "Total Annual Effect").
Our theoretical model in section 3 suggests three types of factors that may affect the evolution of our dependent variables: 1) cost of technology transfer, 2) government policies, and 3) ownership structure. Measures of technology transfer costs are difficult to observe, so we rely on two proxies: 1) product differentiation and 2) R&D intensity. Our hypotheses are that sectors with higher R&D intensity and product differentiation will be ones for which technology transfer is more costly for the Chinese firm. Before turning to our results, it is important to note that our hypotheses come from a model of one-time competition between a single foreign firm and a single Chinese firm. In reality, of course, there are likely many foreign and Chinese firms for even a given HS6
product and there has been ongoing FDI into China over our sample period. This most obviously affects our foreign market share variable, where continual FDI can lead us to see increasing foreign market shares even if significant technology transfer is taking place.
Likewise, unit value gaps may increase over time if foreign firms are locating ever more sophisticated products into China. On one hand, this is not a significant issue in examining the role of various factors in catch-up -it simply means that a factor that would lead to greater declines in foreign market share in our pure theoretical model simply translates into smaller increases in foreign market share in a world where foreign market shares are generally increasing over time. However, we will have to careful not to assert that there is no technology catch-up if we do not find falling foreign market shares or unit value gaps in our analysis. To address this further, at the end of our empirical section, we regress unit value gaps not on year dummies, but on lagged foreign market share to control for the dynamic changes in FDI patterns explicitly and more clearly identify any net technology transfer effect.
Benchmark
To explore the evolution of relative foreign and Chinese export market shares and unit values we first regress each of our dependent variables on year dummies to uncover the general dynamic pattern over our sample. Our model explains about 84% of the variation in relative foreign and Chinese export market share and roughly 60% in relative unit values.
We lose approximately one-third of our observations in estimating (17) due to cases in which only one of the two firm types export in a sector for a particular year. 8 The results of the benchmark estimation are provided in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 . In what follows relative foreign and Chinese export market shares (FS) will be presented in the first of the two columns; whereas relative unit values (UV) will be is given in the second. We find that conditional on foreign investment in an industry, foreign firms are gaining export market share relative to Chinese firms over time. More specifically, as compared to 1997 the relative foreign-to-Chinese export market shares increased by 1.2 percent in 1998 and 4.9 percent in 2005. Moreover, the unit value gap between foreign firms and Chinese firms is 8 As our model indicates, sample selection concerns may be quite important for our estimates of factors affecting Chinese catch-up. Interestingly, we found that sample selection effects were often rejected as insignificant in our regression estimates and had hardly any impact on other estimated coefficients. Thus, we only report estimates without any sample selection correction.
increasing over time during our sample period. However, the increase in the relative unit values peaked around 2003 then began to narrow in the last two years of the sample period.
In the remainder of the section, we will explore how the dynamic patterns systematically differ for various attributes beginning with the cost of technology transfer using the following estimation equations: 
where jt Tech denotes the cost of technology transfer and jt t Tech YD ⋅ is the interaction between the year dummy and the cost of technology transfer for each year t and product code j.
Cost of Technology Transfer
As previously mentioned, we use two methods to measure of cost technology transfer costs: 1) product differentiation and 2) R&D intensity. Table 1 presents the findings for production differentiation in columns 3 to 10. Contrary to our hypotheses, the marginal effects in column 3 suggest that sectors with product differentiation decline in relative foreign-to-Chinese market shares. However as expected the higher cost of technology transfer leads to an increase in the relative foreign-to-Chinese unit values. Namely, there is no evidence of catch-up by Chinese firms for differentiation products even though their export market share is increasing relative to the foreign firms. In columns 5 and 6, we sum the coefficient on the year dummy and the coefficient on the interaction between the year dummy and differentiated products. Similar to the benchmark specification, the results indicate an increase in the relative market shares. Moreover, while the sum of the coefficients on the year dummy and the interaction variable is positive, the unit value gap is smaller after 2003.
To further analyze the cost of technology transfer, we identify goods shipped to the Dest stands for destination of sales with u = G-3, Hong Kong. Considering goods exported only to the G-3 countries help to account for the increasingly role of Western and Japanese FDI in China during the 1990s (Branstetter and Feenstra, 2002) . Moreover, the opportunity for spillover is larger with G-3 countries since they are the source of technological advancement. The motivation to control for sales to Hong Kong stems from its role as intermediaries in China's export performance .
The values presented in columns 7 to 10 is the sum of β t ,δ jt , and η jt in estimating (20) and (21) for the two sales destinations. Comparing columns 5, 7, and 9, we find that the rising relative foreign-to-Chinese market shares is larger for goods shipped directly to the G-3 countries relative to those exported to all destinations and Hong Kong. Interestingly, the unit value gap is larger for goods shipped to Hong Kong. Moreover, starting from 2004, the relative unit values are smaller for goods destined for the G-3 countries as compared to the entire sample.
The results of our second proxy for cost of technology transfer, R&D intensity, is provided in Table 2 . Similar to the results of differentiated goods, the marginal effects of R&D intensity given in columns 1 and 2 are negative; however, the results are insignificant.
The findings in columns 3, 5 and 7 are not statistically different from the overall general trends. In general, the relative unit values are also rising for good shipped to the all countries, the G-3 countries, and Hong Kong. Taken together, our findings suggest Chinese firms fail to catch-up in sectors that are more costly in terms of technology transfer.
Government Policies
An "encourage" policy means that the Chinese government offers incentives to promote inflows of FDI. To examine the importance of government policies we re-estimated (18) to (21) where we substituted Tech jt with Policy t . Presented in columns 1 to 6 in Table 3 the results show that regardless of export destination, relative foreign-to-Chinese market shares increase more in these encouraged industries. 10 Thus, there is evidence that encouragement brings in FDI by foreign firms. While the change in relative unit value differences is unclear for the marginal effects and widens for goods sent to Hong Kong, the results also show that the relative unit value is negative and significant in the latter two years for goods exported to the G-3 countries. This result supports the finding by Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2006) that "learning-by-exporting" effects are significant for firms exporting to developed countries, but not those exporting via Hong Kong.
10 Note that the relative market shares are negative and significant for goods shipped to Hong Kong in the first two years of our sample.
Contrary to policies that encourage FDI, the Chinese government may restrict the activities of foreign firms for a number of reasons: i) to limit competition in the domestic market, ii) to control strategic sectors (such as national defense or natural resources), or iii) to promote technology transfer. The results of the estimation with the "restrict" policy is also provided Table 3 . Columns 7 and 8 show that there is no change in relative foreign-to-Chinese market shares, but obvious decrease in relative unit value differences over time relative to general trend, suggesting that the technology transfer is occurring in restricted industries. Upon closer examination, the findings suggest that unlike the "encouraged" policy, the technology transfer under the "restrict" policy occurs mainly through goods exported to Hong Kong rather than the G-3 countries. However, the relative foreign-to-Chinese market shares increase for goods shipped to both Hong Kong and the G-3 countries with the shares rising faster for the latter.
Ownership Structure
In addition to cost of technology transfer and government polices we expect that the structure of the firm ownership may also affect the evolution of our dependent variables.
Specifically, we expect to find that the foreign market share and relative unit value gap to decrease for joint ventures (JV) relative to wholly-foreign owned FIEs. To examine our hypotheses we estimate (16) and (17) separately for the two different ownership structures.
The annual changes in relative market shares and unit values for JVs and FIEs are shown in Table 4 . Columns 1 and 2 presents the JVs results for relative foreign-to Chinese market shares and unit value, respectively; whereas columns 3 and 4 gives the wholly-foreign owned FIEs findings in columns 3 and 4. As expected, the relative market shares are decreasing for joint ventures. Moreover, the relative market shares are decreasing at an increasing rate over the years as compared to 1997. The results, however, are opposite for FIEs. For both ownership types, the relative unit value gap is increasing, which suggests a lack of technology transfer.
As a further analysis, we examine the evolution of our dependent variables for two sectors: i) machinery given in Table 5 and ii) electronics shown in Table 6 suggest that the relative foreign market shares are also rising for electronics bounded for the G-3 countries while decreasing for those going to Hong Kong. The declining relative market share for electronics exported to Hong Kong but not to the G-3 countries may indicate more direct involvement via vertical differentiation by foreign firms over the years rather than outsourcing through the Chinese city-state. Noteworthy is that electronics results suggest evidence of technology transfer for restricted foreign investment. However, the results are opposite for the "encourage" policy where there is a widening of the unit value gap.
Is Increasing FDI Masking "Catch Up" Effects?
A concern with our estimates, and the unexpected increasing foreign market share and relative unit values, is the issue of increasing FDI activity over time. Obviously an increase of FDI into China of export-oriented foreign firms may be a driving force in the increase in foreign firm export market shares, thus masking any catch-up effects. Likewise, if these new foreign firms are locating products in China that are increasingly more sophisticated, this could be behind the rising gap in foreign-to-Chinese relative unit values as well. However, an important argument against such a concern is that the ratio of FDI in China relative to GDP has been fairly constant around 15% since the early 1990s, as shown in Figure 4 . In fact, FDI stock as a percent of GDP has even fallen some over our sample period from 1997 to 2005.
As a further way to investigate this issue, we use our available data to control for previous FDI in the HS6 as much as the data allow. While we do not have data on FDI by industries into China over time (much less at the HS product level), we can use prior foreign market share in a HS6 product as a proxy for previous FDI. Thus, we estimate the following specification that modifies equation (17) 
where LagFS jt is a term that controls for previous (lagged) foreign-firm market share in a HS6 product. 11 There are a number of ways in which we could specify this lagged term, but we chose to construct as a moving average of the previous 3 years of the foreign market share (FS jt ) in a given HS6 product j. 12 Table 7 provides results from various runs of this specification. Column (1) provides our benchmark specification with now some evidence of fairly modest catch-up by Chinese firms as evidenced by the statistically significant negative coefficient on the lagged foreign market share term. Interestingly, current period foreign market share is strongly associated 11 We do not estimate a similar foreign market share equation due to more serious endogeneity concerns adding lagged foreign market share terms in that setting.
with much greater increase in the relative foreign-to-Chinese unit values, suggesting that new FDI involves much greater unit values (i.e., sophistication). Comparing the ratios of the two terms suggests that the Chinese firms are able to then close the gap over the next three years by about 12% (-0.122 relative to 1.013).
In the subsequent columns, we again examine how various factors may affect this catch-up by interacting these factors with our regressors and reporting the appropriate sums of the coefficients to yield the effect for our sub-sample of interest. The next two columns provide estimates for differentiated products and high technology products, sub-samples for which we would expect that catch-up effects would be lessened. While the catch-up effect is smaller for differentiated products at about 7.4% (-0.104 relative to 1.397), the hightechnology sector looks virtually identical to the full sample. The next two columns look at how sectors affected by Chinese government policies vary in their catch-up effect. These sectors are surprisingly much different from the rest of the sample in showing no catch-up effects whatsoever. Thus, to the extent that these government policies are intended to encourage technology transfer, we find no evidence of this. The final two columns of Table   7 provide separate estimates when we look at just FIEs and JVs, respectively. Surprisingly, the catch-up is larger for FIEs than the general sample, though not precisely estimated, while there is no evidence of catch-up for Chinese firms vis-à-vis the JVs where we would expect it to be larger than the general sample.
Conclusion
Facilitating technology transfer to allow their domestic firms to catch up to foreign firms invested in their country is an obvious goal of the Chinese government in the policies 12 We also tried putting in separate lags of Fshare going back up to 4 years, but found that standard errors for up of Chinese firms. In particular, the encourage policies facilitated the narrowing of the unit value gap between foreign and Chinese firms in goods shipped to the G-3 countries in the last two years of our sample period while the restrict policies successful decreased the unit value differential in exports to Hong Kong and for electronic goods. However, we fail to find that joint venturing activity with foreign firms leads to greater catching up in sophistication within a HS6 product code.
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Sources: FDI stock data come from UNCTAD's World Investment Report, various issues, and GDP data come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. 
Given the parameter values and relationships presented in the text, this is easily signed as negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Simple comparative static to be detailed in next draft.
Proof of Corollaries 3a and 3b:
Using notation for relative price and unit values above, we can derive the following expressions: 
